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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
However, while the just title is an objective element, the "good
faith" requirement is strongly subjective. Thus, where the
transferee acquired an undivided interest, or a number of un-
divided interests and unrelated fractional interests, in a tract of
land, he never dealt with any person or group of persons who
purported to own the whole property. Therefore, he could not
have an honest belief that he was the real owner of the whole
tract. In rejecting the plea of prescription, the weight of the
decision was placed on the lack of the necessary element of good
faith.
MINERAL RIGHTS*
Harriet S. Daggett**
A suit was filed in Leaderbrand and Hardy v. Shallow Oil
Co.' for the cancellation of an oil and gas sub-lease on ground
that the ten shallow wells thereon were not producing in com-
mercial quantities and for damages for removal of certain equip-
ment and for attorney's fees. During the course of the trial de-
fendant abandoned any claim to six of the wells and the lower
court gave judgment to plaintiff cancelling the sub-lease except
as to five acres around each of four producing wells and refused
the demand for attorney's fees. It was stipulated in the record
that the lease was paying in commercial quantities as to the land-
owner, lessor, and the defendant, sub-lessee. The court held that
the production could not be governed by the amount received for
the small overriding royalty because to do so would be to destroy
the rights of the lessor and the operating sub-lessee. This decision
is in line with the jurisprudence on the test of production in com-
mercial quantities.2 The court denied plaintiff's claim for attor-
ney's fees. This result seems eminently correct. The court dis-
tinguished the prior jurisprudence where attorney's fees were
allowed for partial cancellation on the ground that only partial
cancellation was sought and obtained. In the instant case, an
entire cancellation was sought and only partial cancellation was
obtained.
*Grateful acknowledgment is hereby registered to my student and friend Earl
E. Veron for his work in the preparation of these materials.
**Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 234 La. 796, 101 So.2d 673 (1958).
2. Noel Estate, Inc. v. Murray, 223 La. 387, 65 So.2d 886 (1953).
3. Wier v. Grubb, 228 La. 254, 82 So.2d 1 (1955) ; Nunley v. Shell Oil Co.,
229 La. 349, 86 So.2d 62 (1956).
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In Richard v. Sohio Petroleum Co.,4 a plaintiff brought suit
to be declared the owner of all oil and gas produced from a cer-
tain well-site located on his property. Plaintiff's vendor granted
a mineral lease on a 91-acre tract and then sold six acres of this
tract to plaintiff. Forty-acre drilling units had been established
and the defendants were granted a permit to directionally drill
a well surfaced on plaintiff's property which was in one unit and
bottomholed near the center of another drilling unit. Plaintiff
was receiving his share of production from units of which his
land formed a part and his vendor was receiving her proportion-
ate share of the unit's production where the well was bottom-
holed. The court held that plaintiff bought the land subject to
the lease and had no greater right than those which would have
been available to his vendor. Under the lease granted by plain-
tiff's vendor, the defendants had the right to drill a well on any
portion of the land covered thereby provided that the mineral
development secured from the operation would inure in part, at
least, to the lessor's benefit. This case is in line with the juris-
prudence on the theory of indivisibility of a lease.
In the case of Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Southern Natural
Gas Co.,5 plaintiffs and defendants, as owners of oil and gas
leases covering the whole of a section, entered into agreements
integrating their interests in this section. The contract provided
that the leasehold estates would be owned, operated, and devel-
oped for the joint benefit of all parties. In 1955, the Conserva-
tion Commissioner issued an order severing 126.4 acres from
this section and adding them to a 640-acre unit in another section.
The area severed was not affected by any of plaintiff's leases
but was covered by the leases held by defendants. Plaintiff sued
for its proportionate share of the amounts from the new unit
that were attributable to the acreage in the section covered by
his agreement with defendants. The court held that this was not
an attack on the legality of the Commissioner's order, but that
the plaintiff was affirming the Commissioner's order and as-
serting its rights under the conventional agreement which the
Commissioner's order did not and could not affect. The court
stated that the unitization of tracts under lease has no other ef-
fect than to allocate to each tract its pro rata share of the pro-
duction from the entire unit. Private contractual rights in such
leases are only superseded when they are in conflict with the
4. 234 La. 804, 101 So.2d 676 (1958).
5. 234 La. 939, 102 So.2d 223 (1958).
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valid orders of the Commissioner of Conservation. The court
construed the agreement to be such that each party became a
joint owner in all three of the leasehold contracts, and plaintiff
was entitled to his proportionate share of the production.
In Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Hussey,6 plaintiff sued to have
an order of the Commissioner of Conservation adding acreage
to units upon which plaintiff had producing wells declared null
and void. The court held that the Commissioner did not abuse
his discretion in issuing the order adding such areas to produc-
ing units and that this order did not amount to a taking of plain-
tiff's property and giving it to others in violation of the due
process clauses of the Federal and Louisiana Constitutions. The
evidence showed that the wells on plaintiff's tracts were drain-
ing the products from the added area and the allowables had
been proportionately increased so that owners of the added acre-
age could recover a share of production.
In Hinchee v. Long Bell Petroleum Co.,7 plaintiff instituted
suits to compel defendant to furnish him a recordable release of
claims asserted by the defendant to mineral rights and for attor-
ney's fees. Plaintiff contended that an instrument executed by
the landowner and servitude owner was sufficient to acknowl-
edge and interrupt prescription so that the servitude had not
terminated when the landowner sold the land. The court held
that the instrument was not sufficient to interrupt prescription.
The court stated the general rule for the requirements to ac-
knowledge and interrupt prescription and found that the instru-
ment in the present case failed to meet these requirements. This
case is consistent with and follows the prior jurisprudence.
In Calhoun v. Gulf Refining Co.,8 plaintiff brought suit for a
declaratory judgment because of conflicting claims of ownership
to leasehold rights in a certain tract of land. Defendant held an
oil, gas, and mineral lease granted by a former owner of the
land. Defendants' lessor had owned only a one-fourth mineral
interest when he leased, but in the contract it was stipulated be-
tween the parties that any additional or greater mineral inter-
est in the leased premises that might be acquired by purchase or
otherwise was also included and leased. Defendants' lessor sold
the land to plaintiff before the three-fourths mineral interest out-
standing prescribed. Plaintiff leased her interest to the other
6. 234 La. 1058, 102 So.2d 455 (1958).
7. 235 La. 185, 103 So.2d 84 (1958).
8. 104 So.2d 547 (La. 1958).
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plaintiffs. Defendants contended that a vendee who takes real
property subject to a recorded lease stands in the shoes of the
original lessor and is bound by every provision of the lease; that
since plaintiff stands in the position of the original lessor, the
doctrine of after-acquired title is applicable and the lease now
covers the entire mineral interest. The court rejected defend-
ants' contention and held that defendants' lessor did not lease
property he did not own. The court stated that the stipulation
about additional mineral interest depended on the lessor acquir-
ing any part or the whole of the outstanding mineral interest.
This was a personal agreement or warranty and his vendee was
under no obligation to carry out this agreement. The court
further stated that even if the lessor leased property of which
he was not the owner, he could not bind the real owner without
his consent. The lessee under a lease contract does not obtain a
real right in the sense of absolute dominion, and a lease is not
one of those real obligations which attach as a burden to the land.
Therefore, when plaintiff acquired the land from defendants'
lessor, while the land was subject to the lease, that lease was
limited to defendants' lessor's ownership in the minerals. The
clause dealing with the outstanding minerals merely evidenced
a personal agreement between the parties and was limited to
whatever additional ownership in the mineral rights the lessor
might acquire and this clause fell when the lessor failed to ac-
quire additional outstanding mineral interests. The outstanding
mineral interests became vested in plaintiff, the owner of the
land, at the time the servitude was extinguished because of its
non-use for a period of more than ten years. On the issue of fail-
ure properly to pay delay rentals, the court held the plaintiff
estopped to say that the payment was too large. Plaintiff waited
some six months before refusing the larger payment. This seems
correct in view of the fact that had plaintiff promptly refused
the larger payment, defendant might have immediately made
separate payment of the amount to retain the lease.
The following cases appeared during the year but contained
little that was really pertinent to this section: Esso Standard Oil
Co. v. Jones,9 Esso Standard Oil Co. v. State,10 California Co. v.
Price," and Hester v. Roberts.'2
9. 233 La. 915, 98 So.2d 236 (1957).
10. 233 La. 954, 98 8o.2d 250 (1957).
11. 234 La. 338, 99 So.2d 743 (1958).
12. 104 So.2d 158 (La. 1958).
